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ILLINOIS
LAW REVIEW
Volume XXIV FEBRUARY, 1930 Number 6
THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
By FOWLER VINCENT HARPER* AND FREDERICK E. HECKELt
I
THE DOCTRINE AND ITS "REASONS"
It is said, in the old books, that "a devise to the heir is void."''
More modern phrasing of this rule will put it that "where a title
by descent and a title by devise concurred in the same individual,
the former predominated, and the heir was in by descent and not
by purchase."' The rule was abrogated in England, by statute," in
1837, but was, and still is, followed in America in many jurisdic-
tions,4 with many curious and anomalous effects, some of which
will be discussed later.
Several considerations have been suggested as the explanation
for the origin of this doctrine. It has been supposed to be the
application of the principle that a man shall not have by gift that
which is his own without the gift.5 On the other hand it is urged
that the doctrine is supported exclusively by grounds determined
by the benefit of third persons, "of the lord for the preservation of
his tenure" and of creditors "for the payment of their debts," that
is, the creditors of the ancestor.8 Again, it is contended, simply,
that it is more convenient that the property should be assets in the
hands of the heir.7
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
-Late Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Rolle's "Abr.," 626.
2. Jartnan on "Wills" (6th ed.) I, 96.
3. 3 & 4 Will. 14 ch. 106, sec. 3, by which an heir, to whom lands are
devised, takes as devisee to all purposes. See Strickland v. Strickland (1839)
10 Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Repr. 659.
4. See infra, notes 66-80.
5. See Biederman v. Seynmour (1840) 3 Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Repr. 144,
145.
6. Cf. 2 Blackstone "Commentaries" 242.
7. Chaplin v. Leroux (1816) 5 M. & S. 15, 105 Eng. Repr. 957.
[627]
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Undoubtedly there were several considerations which wil ac-
count for the development of this dogma. But chief among them
must be placed the feudal doctrine of primogeniture. It was to the
lord's interest that the fief be impartible.8 Consequently when the
rules affecting military tenure were extended to free tenures, primo-
geniture became the rule9 and all doctrines depending upon and cor-
relative to primogeniture became equally applicable.
Arising out of these economic considerations, were those of
the social tradition to account for the long survival of the doctrine.
To inherit property was more "worthy" than to acquire it by pur-
chase, and the family pride of English landowners is nowhere better
evidenced than in the persistence with which real property was kept
within the blood. Thus there were strong social forces which de-
manded that devises fail when without the devise there would be
an inheritance. So deep rooted in the common law was thd doc-
trine of "worthier title," that only statutory enactment could alter
it, and nothing could prevail to prevent the courts from pushing it
to the extreme limit of its application. The limit, however, when
reached, was preserved with the scrupulousness with which all
dogmas affecting the disposition of land were guarded. But it is
by'no means certain that modern American courts have been so ac-
curate, nor yet so clear as to the exten, to which the doctrine is
properly and reasonably applicable.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
In 1555 the case of Hinde v. Lyon10 was decided. In this case,
the action was debt against the heir, who pleaded riens per descent.
It appeared that the ancestor had devised the whole land "to his
wife till the heir should be of age of twenty-four years, and at that
age the heir should have the whole to himself and his heirs forever;
and that when he should come to the age of twenty-four years, the
wife should have the third part during her life; and if the heir died
before the age of twenty-four. years, that then the land should re-
main to the wife during her life, and after her death (if the heir
had no issue) remainder to A the daughter of the devisor in tail,
remainder to the right heirs of the devisor." It was held that the
land was assets in the hands of the heir, the wife dying after he
became of age, for the fee simple had descended to the son.
No authority is cited in this case, and no reasons given. Sev-
8. 3 Holdsworth "History of English Law" 172.
9. Ibid. 173 and notes.
10. (1555) 2 Dy. 124a, 73 Eng. Repr. 271.
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eral other cases followed, in which it was similarly held that a de-
vise to the heir, such as this, was void,1 and the heir took by de-
scent. From the early cases, and those which followed, the doctrine
developed into a dogma of the common law, and it was repeatedly
said that'where the same estate is devised to the heir that he will
take under the law, the devise is void, for he takes by his more
worthy title, as heir.' 2
But in 1629, a more complicated case came before the court.
In Gilpin's case"8 the ancestor had devised land in fee to his son
and heir, but the devise was charged with the payment of his debts
within a year. In a suit against the heir for the ancestor's debt, it
was held that the heir took the fee as purchaser and not as heir,
since the devise was tied with a condition. This condition, pre-
sumably, made the estate devised different from that which the heir
would have taken at law, had there been no devise to him, conse-
quently the doctrine was rejected, and the heir regarded as a pur-
chaser.
In Britain v. Charnock 4 which was debt upon a bond against
the defendant, as heir, riens per descent was pleaded and it was
found that the father had devised to his eldest son and his heirs
within four years after his decease, provided the son pay twenty
pounds to the executrix toward the payment of the testator's debts,
other lands also being devised for the payment of debts. The father
died and the son paid the twenty pounds. It was held, however,
that "where the heir takes by a will with a charge, as in this case,
he doth not take by descent, but by purchase.' 6
Thus, it seemed, the limitation of the doctrine of the worthier
title had been reached. The devise must not be fettered with a
charge or a condition. If it were, the estate devised differed from
that which would descend, and the devise was good. But in 1698,
the theory of Gilpin's case was definitely overthrown, and the wor-
thier title doctrine extended. Here,16 though there was the possi-
bility of a charge if the wife, who had a life estate, should make an
appointment, "it was resolved by the whole court, that judgment
should be for the plaintiff, for the heir took by descent, and not by
11. See cases cited in Coke "Institutes" 12b and 2 Blackstone "Com-
mentaries" 242 (note).
12. See Coke "Institutes" 12b, note 63.
13. (1629) Cro. Car. 162, 79 Eng. Repr. 740.
14. (1677) 2 Mod. 286, 86 Eng. Repr. 1076.
15. Cf. Pybus v. Milford (1674) 1 Freem. K. B. 369, 89 Eng. Repr. 275.
16. Clerk v. Smitl (1698) 1 Comyns 73, 92 Eng. Repr. 965; see 1 Salk.
241, 91 Eng. Repr. 214.
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the will; and it would be mischievous if every little legacy should
alter the course of descent . . ."
Thus it developed that a charge upon the estate did not break
the descent, for it did not alter the estate devised. It.is apparent
that the quantity, in the sense of the amount which the heir gets,
is materially lessened under the devise. The quality, however, or
nature of the tenure is the same. Hence, we find the rule stated, in
1702, as depending upon the identity in quality only.'7 Lord Holt
here said:
"For the difference is, where the devise makes an alteration of the
limitation of the estate, from that which the law would make by de-
scent; and where the devise conveys the same estate, as the law would
make by descent; but charges it with incumbrances. In the former
case the heir takes by purchase, in the latter by descent."
From Clark v. Smith, in 1698, there is no doubt about the
proposition that charges do not break the descent. The quality of
the estates being the same, it is said, the devise is void and the doc-
trine applies.'
The next serious problem in the applications of this doctrine
arose in 1759, in Scott v. Scott. 9 In this case, there was involved
the construction and effect of a will, devising lands to the heir, sub-
ject to an executory devise. It appeared that A having covenanted
to settle lands upon his wife of the value of one hundred pounds
for life, devised to her an estate of the annual value of fifty pounds,
and directed his executors to purchase sufficient land to make up
the annual value to one hundred pounds. Thereafter he devised all
his real estate, not thereinbefore devised, to B, his eldest son, his
heirs and assigns, but in case he should die without issue before
twenty-one, over. B took, it was said, by devise and therefore the
legatees were not entitled to resort to the lands so devised for so
much of the personal estate as should be exhausted in making up
the estate for the wife.
This was regarded as a new case, and the heir was held to take
by devise because the estate given was different in quality from the
estate which would have descended. As was said, in argument,
"here the devise, though a devise of a fee, is subject to and fettered
with an executory devise. The heir has, therefore, not the same
estate as would have descended to him." This case for some years
17. Emerson v. Inchbird (1702) 1 Ld. Ry. 728, 91 Eng. Repr. 1386.
18. "It is a positive rule of law, that wherever a devise gives to the heir
the same estate in quality as he would have by descent, he shall take by the
latter:' Note to Scott v. Scott, infra note 19.
19. (1759) 1 Eden. 458, 28 Eng. Repr. 762.
THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
was regarded as marking the limitation of the worthier title doc-
trine. There was such an alteration, by the condition, as to break
the descent. "'The better opinion,' as observed by Preston20 in
reference to the present case, 'is, that he takes under the will, as
the quality of the estate is altered, as he takes a fee with a qualifi-
cation, instead of a fee absolutely.'"
But how can this decision be squared with the early case of
Hinde v. Lyon,21 two hundred years before, where a devise to the
wife till the heir was twenty-four, remainder over in case the heir
died before twenty-four, was held not to break the descent? The
lord keeper, in the Scott case had no difficulty with this situation.
"There are two kinds of executory devises, one where the testator
devises his estate to his heir, and to go over on a contingency, which is
to take place within a reasonable time; the other where he devises it
over on a future contingency, and being silent as to what shall happen
to it in the meantime, thereby permits it to descend to his heir."
In Hinde v. Lyon, the fee was not devised at all except upon a
future contingency. It was a devise to the wife until the son be-
came twenty-four. If the son died before twenty-four without
heirs, over. While the son was living and before he attained the
age of twenty-four, the fee was not disposed of at all, hence it may
be "permitted to descend." Under such reasoning, if the son
reached the age of twenty-four, it may well be argued that the fee
does not become his by the devise, for he has already inherited it,
and he cannot become thus a purchaser.
22
From this viewpoint, Scott v. Scott shows a very different
situation. Here the fee was devised immediately to the heir, but to
go over on the happening of a contingency. Such an estate is re-
20. 3 Preston "Conveyances" 261.
21. Supra, note 10.
22. The devise to the wife here was that of an estate for years. The
attempted devise to the heir could not be a contingent remainder as the par-
ticular estate here is less than a freehold. See Tiffany "Real Property"
sec. 140 and Tiedeinan 'Real Property" sec. 397. If it had been made to a
person other than the heir, it would have been good as an executory devise.
Gray "Rule against Perpetuities" sec. 60, states: ". . . it has been
repeatedly held that a future contingent devise after ant estate for years is
a good executory devise, and not a bad remainder." See also Tiffany supra
sec. 173, note 35. The seisin until such third party became twenty-four years
of age would not be in abeyance but would be considered in the heir at law.
See Tiffany supra, sec. 160. See also, Gray "Perpetuities" sec. 17, note 2.
Here, if upheld, the attempted devise would result in an executory devise to
the heir, subject to a reversionary fee in the same person, the sum of which
vould amount to the reversion that the heir would take by descent, if the
devise to him in the will were omitted. It was an attempt to devise by will
exactly the same estate that the heir would have taken as a representative
of the devisor by descent, and therefore void. See Tiffany sec. 130.
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garded as vested subject to being divested. The condition of the
limitation over in Hinde v. Lyon was a condition precedent, while
that involved in Scott v. Scott was a condition subsequent to the
heir's estate. In the former case, the heir's estate never vested until
he became of age; in the latter situation, his estate terminated if he
died prior to arriving at the prescribed age.
Thus we can account for the distinctions made by the court
between the facts in Scott v. Scott and earlier cases. In 1818, how-
ever, Doe v. Timmins2" overruled the doctrine of the Scott case
and again the worthier title was extended to include devises involv-
ing an executory devise. Heroic attempts were made to account for
the Scott case and to reconcile it with subsequent decisions. Thus
it was said:
"The determination in this case (Scott v. Scott) is right, but the
reason given for it is wrong . . . Though a devise to thq testator's
heir, if not restrained to a less estate than a fee simple, is void, as to
passing the estate, yet the devise to the heir will in many instances
influence the construction of the will, as was holden by Lord
Holt . . ."24
The argument here seems to; be that although a devise to an
heir is void, as a devise, still it may be effective as indicating the
intention of the testator as to the relative claims, of the heir and
other legatees. As Lord Eldon said of a charge in Bailey v.
Ekens, 2 5 it is a declaration of intention "upon which a court of
equity will fasten." The devise, with the limitation attached, is
operative to the extent that it is subject to an executory devise, but
"for the purpose of making the heir take otherwise than by de-
scent, the devise is said to be void."28
There is the further analogy of a general legatee and a specific
legatee. The writer of the note, supra, pointed out "since the
testator had devised the lands, that they ought to be exempted, for
it was as much the testator's intention that th devisee should have
this land, as that the others should have the legacies, and a specific
legacy is never broke into in order to make good a pecuniary one."
Thus, the result in the Scott case may be accounted for without in-
volving the worthier title dogma at all. To be sure, this is not a
legal "reason," while the worthier title doctrine, were it properly
applied, would be such a "reason." The analogy of the general and
specific legatees fails as a logical reason in that it presupposes that
23. (1818) 1 B. & Ald. 531, 106 Eng. Repr. 195.
24. Hill's Note in Ambler, 383, 27 Eng. Repr. 255.
25. (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 319, 32 Eng. Repr. 130.
26. Biedermn v. Seymour, supra note S.
THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
the heir is a devisee, which is the very question to be determined.
However, it does furnish an analogy, and it might be plausibly
argued that since the testator has attempted to do what the law will
not permit him to do, i.e. make his heir a purchaser, nevertheless
he had expressed his intention that he wanted his heir to take the
specific lands, and consequently there is such a declaration of in-
tention as a "court of equity will fasten upon."
Counsel in Chaplin v. Leroux 27 attempted to reconcile the cases
by maintaining that Scott v. Scott was decided upon the ground that
the eldest son took an estate tail. This is patently absurd, and but
suggests the length to which the common law lawyer would some-
times go to square a precedent which he feared might stand in the
way of a desirable extension of a dogma. But the extension was
made. The worthier title doctrine had never rested upon any
proposition except the identity in quality of estates under the will
and under the law. The social tradition still demanded and the
courts respected the preservation of estates inherited by and
through blood. There may have been sufficient considerations,
although relics of feudal England, at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, to create a social pressure which the courts were
neither able, nor disposed, to oppose. The real reasons behind the
extension, as behind the origin of the doctrine, were social and
economic. So long ad these forces continued, the doctrine would
be pushed to its limits.
And the doctrine was pushed to its limits. It became firmly
established. In 1833, the whole doctrine was reviewed and further
rationalized. 28 The Master of Rolls explained:
"It has always been the established doctrine, that a charge upon
an estate devised to the heir does not break the descent; how then, will
a condition operate? The charge partially affects the devise, the con-
dition wholly affects it; and it being determined that a charge, which
carries off a part does not break the descent, neither does a condition,
which in a particular event would carry off the whole, break the de-
scent."
This reasoning is clear when we remember that it had already
been determined that a charge upon the estate would be enforced
althoughN the devise to which the charge was fastened was inopera-
tivei to pass the estate; the heir took by the law. In fact, Chaplin
v. Leroux2 9 was a case involving a devise which not only put a
charge upon the estate granted to the heir, but made a failure to
27. (1816) 5 M. & S. 15, 105 Eng. Repr. 957.
28. Mainbridge v. Plumner (1833) 2 My. & K. 92, 39 Eng. Repr. 879.
29. Supra, note 27.
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discharge these charges, a condition precedent to the termination
of the heir's estate. In a sense, then, here was both a charge and
an executory devise. Nevertheless, the estate passed by law, for it
was the same in quality, as the estate devised. Upon the failure
of the heir's estate, by a default in payment of the charges, there
was a grant to G. T. in trust "to enforce the charges and in trust
for the said son."
"If. the estate devised to the trustee be an executory devise, the
law will cast the estate of the heir on him by descent, until the contin-
gency happens; if the trustee's estate be not an executory devise, I do
not see that there is necessarily such an estate of freehold given to him
as to break in upon and alter the quality of the estate which the heir
would otherwise take."
This was the fully developed doctrine which the common law
had moulded out of the theory of the worthier title when the statute
brought an end to its more than three hundred years of life in
England. As we shall see, we have it still in America.
THE TEST FOR THE DOCTRINE
There seems to be a confused idea in some of the early cases
that there is involved here a theory of election. Thus Smith v.
Ttiggs0 considered the rights of one Jane Day in a copyhold estate.
She was both the heir of the testator and his devisee. Under the
will, a surrender and admittance was necessary to complete her
estate. Under the law this was not necessary. There had been no
admittance, so under the devise, Jane's estate must fail. The court
allowed her to prevail on the theory that the devise was void. It
was said: "If Jane Day were to claim by the will, that title was
never complete for want of an admittance. That plainly shows her
election to be in of her more worthy title by descent. That was a
complete and perfect title, but the other was not."
But this theory is unsound, by the very principles involved in
the doctrine of worthier title. There is no question of election here
at all. Jane could not take by the devise. The real question was
whether or not Jane's estate under the will was the same in quality
as her estate by inheritance. It was, notwithstanding an admittance
were necessary if she took by devise. The tenure was unchanged.
Consequently, she must take under the law, for she will not be per-
mitted to be a purchaser. No election on her part could change
the rule of law which forbids the heir to be a purchaser, where the
estate is the same as allowed by the law.
30. (1735) 1 Strange 486.
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So, in Preston v. Holnwss it was held "that the devise is void,
and that it is not in the power of John, the son, to make the election
to take by descent or by purchase at 'his pleasure, but he must of
necessity take the land as the law directs, which is by descent; and
it is against a maxim in law to give a thing to such a person to
whom the law gives it, if it had not been so given. '8 2
"The test for the rule, says Mr. Crosley, is to strike out of
the will the particular devise to the heir, and then, if without that
he would take by descent exactly the same estate which the devise
purports to give him, he is in by descent and not by purchase. 83
In Preston v. Holmes 4 the simple situation was presented of
a devise to the testator's wife for life, and after her death to I, his
eldest son and to his heirs. The question was whether I took by
devise or by descent. Here it is quite clear that if that portion of
the devise which fixed I's interest were omitted, he would take, as
heir, exactly the same estate as the testator proposed to give him in
the will. In either case, his estate was subject to the life estate of
the wife. I must therefore take by descent, for, it was said, the
devise to the heir is void.
In Manbridge v. Plummert5 a more difficult situation was pre-
sented. Here there was a life estate to the wife, and, after her
decease, to the testator's granddaughter, her heirs and assigns. The
granddaughter was the only child of a deceased daughter and the
testator's sole heir at law. There was, however, an executory devise
in case the granddaughter should die under twenty-one without issue.
It was held that the granddaughter, at the death of the tenant for life,
took by descent rather than by purchase. Applying the test, it is seen
that if the devise to the heir were eliminated from the will, as heir,
she would take the same quality of estate and to exactly the same ex-
tent. She would take the fee, subject to the life interest of the wife,
and subject to the condition that her estate would be defeated in case
she died before twenty-one without issue. This condition is still
31. (1648) Sty, 149, 82 Eng. Repr. 601.
32. "The cases on this subject proceed on the supposition that there
is no election in the heir to take by descent or purchase, for the descent is
immediately cast on him, and the devise is considered as having no operation
at all.
"For if the heir might, at his choice, have taken by purchase, the lord
would have lost many emoluments of his seigniory and the specialty creditor
of the ancestor, the fund which was answerable for their demands, for until
the Stat. Will. III., the devisee was not liable." Taylor, C. J., in University
v. Holstead (1816) 4 N. C. 289, 290-291.
33. 6 Kent "Commentaries" 506, citing Crosley's "Treatise on Wills"
101 (London, 1828).
34. Supra, note 31.
35. (1833) 2 My. & K. 93, 39 Eng. Repr. 879.
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attached to her estate, for it was a part of the "remainder over,"
as well as a condition to her estate under the will. Thus only that
portion of the devise which vests an estate in her is regarded as
void. It is still operative as fixing the limitation over to the
remainder man.
Lord Eldon explained this, in Bailey v. Ekeis 6 as follows:
"But, when it is said, the heir takes by his better title, still the
question is whether he takes, as he would, if that devise had not
been made; taking the circumstances of the devise together. A
mere charge is no legal interest. It is not a, devise to any one, but
that declaration of intention upon which a court of equity will
fasten."
In Ambler's note to Scott v. Scott supra, it was said, "It
amounts to the same as if there had been no devise to him, but only
a devise from him upon a contingency; and, therefore, if the con-
tingency in which the devise from him is to take effect never
happens, the heir takes by descent and not by purchase."
Thus the many cases which hold that a charge upon the de-
visee's estate does not change the quality thereof so as to prevent
the application of the worthier title doctrine, are made intelligible. 7
The court is not applying what might appear to be an anomalous
doctrine of following a devise which it declares at the same time
to be void. It is simply following out the testator's declared inten-
tions as to the other beneficiaries for whom the charge is imposed.
To do otherwise and allow the heir to take by descent, free from
the charges, would be to invalidate not only the devise to the heir,
but to the other legatees and devisees as well.
So, in Hainsworth v. Prettyu where a man made a bequest
of twenty pounds to his youngest son, and then devised his lands
to his eldest son "upon condition he should pay the said twenty
pounds and if he refuse, that then the youngest son shall have the
land," it was held that the condition was enforcible on behalf of
the youngest son, although the eldest son took nothing by the devise.
He took by descent. "And all the justices . . . resolved that
the defendant's entry was lawful; for this devise to the eldest son,
and his heirs, is void by the way of devise; but it is an immediate
devise or limitation to the younger children if the eldest son per-
forms not the condition . . . "3 Thus, although as a devise
36. (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 319, 32 Eng. Repr. 130.
37. Clerk v. Snmth (1698) 1 Salk. 241.
38. (1602) Cro. Eliz. 919, 78 Eng. Repr. 1140.
39. Ibid. 1141.
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to the heir the will was ineffective, it was valid enough as a limita-
tion to the youngest son, which intention being clearly expressed
was enforcible.
Consequently, it is clear how all charges and conditions attached
to a devise were upheld, although the heir was deemed to take his
estate by the worthier title of descent. But in so far as there was a
limitation over, the will was still good. Therefore, in applying the
test whether the heir would take exactly by the law as under the
will, the devise to the heir must be considered in its capacity as
fixing the limitation over, if there be such. A hypothetical situa-
tion will indicate the rule further. A testator devises land to his
wife for life, and at her death to his eldest son (then in esse) for
life, remainder to X. By the will, the son takes subject to the wife's
estate and for life only. Under the law, were that portion which
vests an estate in the heir omitted, he would take subject to the
wife's estate and for life only because X gets the land at the heir's
death, for the clause which devises to the son is operative to deter-
mine the limitation to the stranger. It is only void in so far as it
devises to the heir. 0
Unfortunately an ambiguity crept into the cases from the
requirement that the quantity of estate devised must be the same
as that which would have descended at law. In Doe v. Timmins"
the testator devised copyhold lands and freeholds to a trustee,
subject to an annuity of eight pounds yearly in copyhold lands to
J for life and an annuity of twenty pounds to his wife for life,
with the right to the wife, if annuity was not paid, to enter and
sell the copyholds; if his grandson, who was the heir at law, reached
the age of twenty-one, he was to be put in possession in fee subject
to the payment of the annuities. If the heir did not reach the age
of twenty-one, limitations over to nieces of the testator. It was
here held that the grandson' and heir took by descent and not by
purchase,' 2 the quantity and quality being the same whether he took
by descent or by devise; the quantity because in both cases he takes
40. In Lerowx v. Chaplin supra, if the devise to the trustee be regarded,
as no doubt it should be regarded, as an executory devise, it is clear that
the quality of the estate which goes td the heir is precisely what it wvould
have been if the testator had devised to the wife and then to the daughter and
her heirs, with the provision that G. T. take as trustee in the event the charges
were in default. The son would take the residue of the estate, subject to
the testementary charges and the contingent estate of the trustee. Hence,
having an estate under the will, identical in quality with what the law would
give him anyway, he takes by his worthier title and is in by descent and not
by purchase.
41. (1818) 1 B. & Aid. 531, 106 Eng. Repr. 195.
42. Cf. Swaine v. Burton (1808) 15 Ves. Jr. 315, 33 Eng. Repr. 792.
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in fee, and the quality because he takes in severalty. But here the
court is in fact speaking of the quantum, not the amount of the
estate. What is called "quantity and quality" means simply the kind
of estate which the heir holds and the way in which he holds it.
In neither case is the amount of the estate significant.4
EXCEPTIONS TO THE OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Th extent and significance of the worthier title doctrine, as
well as its operation may be understood from a consideration of
the situations to which it was not applicable. "To make the heir
take by devise, as observed by Lord Eldon in Bailey v. Ekins,"
there must be 'an alteration of the limitation of the estate from that
which the law would make by descent'; as a devise, of an estate
tail to an heir; of land in fee to two daughters being testator's
heirs; of gavelkind lands to several sons; of all testators land to one
of two daughters, etc." '45 It will be helpful to examine these illustra-
tions separately.
Illustration 1.--"devise of an estate tail to an heir." As is
well known the estate tail arose as a creature of the Statute De
Donis." Prior to that statute considerable confusion had apparently
existed as to the various results of a gift of a conditional fee, i.e., a
gift to one and the heirs of his body.4 7 But it seems that it became
fairly well settled that- a gift to a man and the heirs of his body
created an estate which was conditional upon the birth of issue.
"Hence if no issue were born," says Holdsworth, "the condition
was not fulfilled, and the donor could recover the land; but if issue
was born, the condition was fulfilled, and the donee got in substance
a fee simple, which he could alienate as he pleased. If, however,
he did not alienate, and died without issue, the estate reverted,
just as if no issue had been born. 48
43. 2 Blackstone ch. 15, Chitty's note: "With respect to what shall
be assets by descent, it is laid down as a general rule that, though the an-
cestor devise the estate to his heir, yet, if he take the same estate in quantity
and quality that the law would have given him, the devise is a nullity, and
the heir is seized by descent, and the estate assets in his hands."
Thus we see that it became accepted that both the "quality and quan-
tity" of the estates must be identical to invoke the operation of the doctrine.
But it is significant that the rule, as thus laid down, had reference to the
quantum of the estate and not, as confused in subsequent cases, to the amount
or proportional share.
44. Supra, note 36.
45. Note to Scott v. Scott supra.
46. 13 Edw. I, ch. 1, St. Westminster 11-1285; see Kent supra, IV, 12,13. 47. See Holdsworth supra, note 8, at 112-113.
48. Op. Cit. at 17-18.
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The statute provided a protection to the issue and prevented
alienation by the donee during his lifetime, the writ of formedon
in descender being the appropriate remedy.4 9 The writ of formedon
in reverter accomplished the same protection for the donor.50 Thus
the donee's interest, upon the grant of such a conditional fee, was
known as an estate tail. The donor had a fee simple expectant
upon the estate tail-a sort of reversionary interest It is obvious,
then, that if the devise to an heir conveyed a fee tail, the quality
of the estate is different than if there had been no such devise and
the heir had taken by descent, although it might have resulted prior
to the statute upon the devisees death with living issue,, that the
result to the heir were the same, both as to the quantity and quality
of the estate remaining. At the time of the testator's death, how-
ever, there were many possibilities which might occur, which would
make the estate tail a very different kind of estate from one in
fee, devolvingo to the heir by descent. This difference in quantum
was sufficient to prevent the application of the worthier title doctrine,
and the devisee takes by purchase instead of descent.51
Illustration 2.-"of land in fee to two daughters being testa-
tor's heirs." An estate in coparcenary was one which arose from
descent, when there was none but female heirs. The rule of pri-
mogeniture, of course, applied only to male issue, and it has been
pointed out how it was the interest of the lord that made both for
coparcenary estates among the daughters and for the rule of
primogeniture among sons.5 2  In fact, it seems that in some respects
the eldest daughter was regarded as the proper person to take
certain indivisible portions of the estate, although she must account
to her sisters fo 4 their share of its value.53 Thus, where a man
died intestate with no male issue, but with two or more daughters
or other female heirs of remoter degree, the heirs took the estate
iri coparcenary.14  This estate differed from that of joint tenants,
primarily in the absence of the feature of survivorship, each co-
parcener having the power to alienate her share, her grantee holding
as tenant in common with the other coparceners.5"
But a devise usually conveyed an estate in joint tenancy,"
and was much favored by the early law for reasons similar to the
49. See 13 Edw. I, ch. 1; see Holdsworth. op. cit. 18.
50. Holdsworth op. cit. 114.
51. See dictum in (1579) Plowd. 545, 75 Eng. Repr. 804.
52. Holdsworthl supra, note 8, at 174-175.
53. 2 Pollock & Maitland "History of English Law" 275.
54. Kent IV, 366.
55. Ibid. 367
56. See 2 Blackstone 180.
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considerations underlying the rule of primogeniture, in that the
right of survivorship tended to reduce the division of tenures.57
Consequently, a devise to two daughters, being heirs of the testator,
would be sufficient to prevent the application of the worthier title
doctrine inasmuch as the daughters, although they be the sole heirs,
take now as joint tenants whereas the law of descent gives them the
estate in coparcenary, and thus differs materially in quality from
the devise.
Accordingly it was early held, where such a devise was made
"that they shall have it as joint tenants; for the devise giveth it
them in another degree than the common law would have given it
them, and for the benefit of the survivorship between them."5 8
Illustration 3.--"of gavelkind lands to several sons" Gav-
elkind, a species of socage tenure peculiar to the county of Kent,"
and insuring against forfeiture to the state in case of execution for
a felony, descended to all the sons equally.60 Thus, were a devise
to provide for the division of such an estate among the sons there
might seem to be no reason why the worthier title doctrine should
not apply. But again, it is the nature of the estate which the sons
take which determines the application of the rule. If the sons
take by the will, they will hold the gavelkind lands as joint tenants,
but if by descent, the tenancy is one of coparcenary. This difference
is one of quality, and sufficient to prevent the worthier title doctrine
from defeating the purchase.6 '
Illustration 4*-"of all testator's lands to one of two daughters."
Here, it is clear that there is a difference between the estates under
the will and under the law. The daughters, under the law, would
inherit equally and hold as coparceners; under the devise, the devisee
takes the fee. There is more than a difference in the devisee's
proportion of the estate; there is a significant difference in the
tenure which determines the quality, the result of which is that
the devisee takes as a purchaser.
Reading v. Royston62 raises this question directly as well as
presents another interesting phase of the doctrine. Here H had
two daughters, one of whom died. H thereupon devised all his
lands to the deceased daughter's son. The question was presented
57. Cf. Fisher v. Wiggq (1700) 1 Salk. 391, 91 Eng. Repr. 339.
58. Anon. (1595) Cro. Eliz. 431, 78 Eng. Repr. 671.
59. 2 Pollock & Maitland supra 271.
60. 1 Tiffany "Real Property" 20-21.
61. Bear's Case (1588) 1 Leon. 113, 74 Eng. Repr. 105.
62. (1703) 1 Salk. 242, 91 Eng. Repr. 214; 1 Comyns 123, 92 Eng. Repr.
994. Cf. also M'Kay v. Hendon (1819) 7 N. C. 209, citing Reading v. Roy-
ston supra. Cf. also Kinney v. Glasgow (1866) 53 Pa. 141.
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whether the grandson should take all by devise or the one moiety
by descent and one by devise. It was held here that he took all by
devise because this was not a devise to an heir. "Both coparceners
make the heir," it was said. "The one is not an heir wiithout the
other; and supposing the devise void as to one moiety, the other
moiety must descend to both."
The court is here declaring that there is no devise to an heir at
all, and consequently no situation for the application of the worthier
title doctrine. In view of the common law theory of coparcenary
estates, this reasoning seems sound enough. In such an estate
there is a unity of title, interest and possession, the seisin of the
one coparcener being regarded generally as the seisin of the other
and the possession of the one, for most purposes, the possession of
the others. 68 The early history of the coparcenary estate makes this
unity clearer. Originally it seems that the eldest daughter held of
the lord and her sisters held of the eldest and did service through
her. Although subsequently the legal rights of the younger
daughters were recognized by law, the fiction of unity of estate was
retained.6 4 Hence it is logical to regard a devise to one of two or
more coparceners as failing to fulfil the requirements of a, "devise
to the heir."
But supposing in Reading, v. Royston supra, the testator had
devised one moiety to the grandson and one to the daughter. Now
there is a "devise to the heir." Nevertheless, it seems, there is
reason here to require both to take by devise rather than by descent,
since, under the will they take as joint-tenants and, had there been
no devise, they would have taken as coparceners A fifth illustra-
tion might be added, above, namely, "or all testator's lands equally
to two daughters." '65 Here the kind or quality, of the estate being
different under the will from that which would descend to the heirs
at law, they take by devise and not be descent.
SUMMARIZATION
The worthier title doctrine, as developed in the common law
and by courts of equity, prior to the statute which abrogated that
doctrine, in 1837, may be summarized as follows:
(a) When a testator devised an estate in lands to his heir,
which was the same in quality and of the same quantum as that
estate in the lands which he would have taken by descent, had there
63. Kent supra, IV, 367.
64. Holdsworth supra, note 8, at 174-175.
65. (1594) Owen, 65, 74 Eng. Repr. 903.
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been no devise to him, the provision in the will is void in so far as it
attempted to make of him a purchaser instead of an heir.
(b) This was a rule of law, primarily based upon the feudal
system and calculated to benefit (1) the lord of the manor, (2)
creditors of the testator; secondarily based upon the social tradition
which favored the descent of property to blood heirs, as being
"worthier" and more consistent with the prestige of the land-
owning class.
(c) Charges upon the land did not invalidate the rule nor
defeat its operation; neither did limitations by way of executory
devise. The quality was not thereby altered.
(d) It was a rule of property, binding upon the heir; and
irrespective of any consent or election on his part, and irrespective
of the intent of the testator.
(e) The quality and quantum of the estate are the determin-
ing elements; not the quantity in the sense of proportion or amount
or value thereof. The principal test is whether the estates are
identical in quality; if so, the devise to the heir is inoperative, if the
quantum in each case is the same.
(f) The doctrine, obviously, had no application to heirs who
could not be disinherited or to "forced heirs." It applied only to
an heir who would have inherited something if the particular devise
to that heir had been omitted. This is of importance in following
the application of the doctrine by American courts.
II
ORTHODOX AMERICAN CASES
The worthier title dogma, while, as said by a Virginia court,
many of its reasons have ceased to exist,66 still, tenaciously holds
its placei in American case law. It has been asserted, applied, or
referred to in some phase or another, in the District of Columbia, 67
Illinois, 8 Indiana,6 9 Iowa,70 Kentucky,7 ' Maryland,7 2 Massachu-
66. See I-Inton, J., in Biedler v. Biedler (1891) 87 Va. 300, 12 S. E. 753.
67. Landic v. Sinwis (1893) 1 App. D. C. 507; see Jost v. Yost (1882) 1
Mack. 487.
68. Cooper v. Martin (1923) 308 Ill. 224, 139 N. E. 68; McCormick
v. Sanford (1925) 318 Ill. 544, 149 N. E. 476; Wiltfang v. Dirksen (1920)
295 Ill. 362, 129 N. E. 159; Darst v. Swearin.qen (1906) 224 Ill. 229, 79 N.
E. 635.
69. Dillman v. Fulwider (1914) 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N. E. 124; Wheeler
v. Loesch (1912) 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502; Thompson v. Turner (1909)
173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314; Rowley v. Sains (1881) 141 Ind. 179, 40 N. E.
674; Stilwell v. Knapper (1880) 69 Ind. 558, 35 Am. Rep. 240. See also
Denny v. Denny (1890) 123 Ind. 240, 23 N. E. 519.
70. Re Davis Estate (Iowa 1927) 213 N. W. 395; In re Schultz's
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setts 13 Mississippi,74 North Carolina,75 New Hampshire,7 6 New
York,77 Ohio,78 Pennsylvania," South Carolina,80 and Tennessee.8 '
Sometimes there is uncertainty in the application of the doc-
trine when the will involves a limitation over after a life estate
has been carved out. Where the limitation over is simply to testa-
tor's "heirs," it is usually held that he intended to mean his heirs
at the time of his death, rather than his heirs at the time of the
termination of the present estate, 2 although if, on a consideration
of the whole will, a contrary intent is clearly manifest, it will be
given effect.8 3
The simplest situation, where property is devised to one for
life, remainder to the testator's heirs or children, has usually been
determined without difficulty.84  Similarly, where the "rest and
residue" of an estate is devised to children or heirs or "relatives,"
after the payment of debts"5 or after a lesser immediate estate,88
Estate (1921) 192 Iowa 436, 185 N. W. 24; Re Will of Watepauqh (1922)
192 Iowa 1178, 186 N. W. 198; Herring v. Herring (1919) 187 Iowa 593,
174 N. W. 364; Tennant v. Smiith (1915)1 173 Iowa 264, 155 N. W. 267;
Rice v. Burkhart (1906) 130 Iowa 520, 107 N. W. 308; First Nat. Bank v.
Willie (1901) 115 Iowa 77, 87 N. W. 734.
71. Mcllwaine v. Robson (1914) 161 Ky. 616, 171 S. W. 413; Taylor
v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. (1914) 158 Ky. 280, 164 S. W. 939.
72. Donnelly v. Turner (1883) 60 Md. 81; Gilpin v. Hollinsworth (1852)
3 Md. 190; Medley v. Williams (1835) 7 G. & J. (Md.) 61.
73. Thompson v. Thornton (1908) 197 Mass. 273, 83 N. E. 880; Sedg-
wick v. Minot (1863) 6 Allen (Mass.) 171; Ellis v. Page (1851) 61 Mass.
161; Whitney v. Whitney (1817) 14 Mass. 88.
74. McDaniel v. Allen (1887) 64 Miss. 417, 1 So. 356.
75. M'Kay v. Hendon (1819) 7 N. C. 209; University v. Holstead (1816)
4 N. C. 289; Campbell v. Herron (1801) 1 N. C. 468.
76. M'Afee v. Gilnore (1828) 4 N. H. 391.
77. Williamns v. Conrad (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 524; Buckley v. Buckley
(1850) 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 43.
78. Huber v. Carew (1904) 26 Ohio C. C. 389; Chambers v. Forsythe
(1885) 1 Ohio C. C. 282.
79. Donohue v. McNichol (1869) 61 Pa. 73. See also Re Houqh's Estate
(1879) 13 Phil. 279.
80. Executors of Searbrook v. Searbrook (1841) 1 McMullan's Eq.(S. C.) 201.
81. Hoover's Lessee v. Gre.qory (1837) 18 Tenn. 444.
82. See Donohue v. McNichol (1869) 61 Pa. 73; Kellett v. Shepard
(1891) 139 Ill. 433, 28 N. E. 751. See also Jarman on "Wills" (5th Am. ed.)
670 if.
83. In Sears v. Russell (1857) 74 Mass. 86 a similar limitation was
held to refer to the heirs at law of the testator at the time of the happening
of the contingency, and was therefore void for remoteness. There were other
considerations in the will to show the testator's intent. See ibid., pp. 94-95.
84. See e. g., Williams v. Conrad (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 524.
85. Hoover's Lessee v. Gregory (1837) 18 Tenn. 444. If the de-
vise over be a "residue," it amounts to the grant of a reversion and conse-
quently the applicability of the worthier title doctrine is clear. "The gift
of a 'residue! implies that the former gift is completed." See Gray "Rule
against Perpetuities" 93 and cases cited. Cf. Chitty's note, Blackstone 242;
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the heirs take by) descent rather than by purchase, and this is true
even though the future estate smacks of an executory devise. 7
The ancient test was accurately applied in Medly v. Williams, the
court observing:
"M. J. Williams had therefore the same estate precisely, and to
be held, and enjoyed in the same manner, as if those previous devises
and bequests, having been made, the will of her father had been silent
as to the land devised by the residuary clause. In other words as if
he had died intestate as to this land. It is a case then in which the
same quantity and quality of estate is devised as the devisee would have
acquired by descent, and in such a case, it is a clear rule of the common
law that the title shall vest by the worthier title-by descent and not
by purchase."88
So also, the doctrine has been logically applied where by the
law of the state, distinctions exist between joint tenancy, copar-
cenary, and tenancy in common and the heir would hold under one
tenure by the law and under a different one under the will. Thus
in Maryland where an estate was devised to several children "in
equal shares and portions" to take "share and share alike," the
worthier title doctrine did not apply because, under the will, the
devisees took as tenants in common. 8  As heirs at law they would
have taken as coparceners. 90  The court expressly repudiated
Chancellor Kent's opinion9 ' that in this country because of the
abandonment of primogeniture there were no distinctions between
coparcenary estates and estates in common.92  Presumably where
"So where one devises to another for life, remainder to his heir in fee, the
heir shall take the reversion by descent."
86. Buckley v. Buckley (1850) 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 43; Tlwompson v. Thorts-
ton (1908) 197 Mass. 273, 83 N. E. 880; Medley v. Williams. (1835) 7 G. & J.
(Md.) 61; 'Taylor v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. (1914) 158 Ky. 280.
164 S. W. 939.
87. Searbrook v. Searbrook (1841) 1 McMullans Eq. (S. C.) 201.
88. (1835) 7 G. & J. (Md.) 61, 70. Cf. Whitney v. Whitney (1817)
14 Mass. 88, 90: "Or if, after several imiesne estates, he should limit the
ultimate remainder to his own right heirs, the remainder would be void, and
the reversion would descend as if no limitation ever had been made. For
whether they should take a remainder or reversion, they would have an ab-
solute fee, after the termination of the mesne estates; and the title by descent
is, in estimation of law, the worthier title."
Cf. also Stilwell v. Knapper (1880) 69 Ind. 558, 565, 35 Am. Rep. 240:
"If the will had stopped after having devised the property to Mary Steely
'to be hers during her natural life or widowhood'; and had not disposed of
the remainder at all, the children of the testator would have inherited the
reversion equally; and this is what the will attempts to devise to them."
89. Gilpin v. Holinsworth (1852) 3 Md. 190; see also Donnelly v. Turner
(1883) 60 Md. 81.
90. Hoffar v. Dement (1847) 5 Gill (Md.) 132.
91. 4 Kent "Commentaries" 367.
92. 3 Md. 195.
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such distinctions are not observed by the property law of the state,
the worthier title theory would work a different result in such a
situation.
In North Carolina, a devise which gave lands to three daughters
as joint tenants, was good since they would have taken under the
law as coparceners. 98 But where it was thought that the devise
gave an estate to devisees as tenants in common, the same court
held the devise void and the heirs in by descent.94
It is also clear from some of the better considered cases that
where the immediate devisee has predeceased the testator, and the
property is to go, by the devise, to devisee's heirs who happen to
be at the same time the heirs of the testator, the doctrine will
operate and the heirs take by descent from the remote, rather than
the immediate ancestor. 5  In this and several other types of case,
the American courts have followed the well beaten path of the
common law and have gotten into little difficulty, 98 some opinions
indicating a thorough understanding of the whole doctrine.9 7  In
other instances as we shall see, radical and violent twistings have
taken place with rather far reaching results.
SOME LocAL VARLwTIONS
The Mississippi court got into trouble with the simple situation
of a devise of lands to a wife for life and at her death to the
heirs of the testator's body.98 Here, the result should be obvious.
At the death of the widow, the heirs are in by descent, and not by
purchase under the will. Still, the court thought the heirs took
under the will. "As heir at law," it was said "he (one of the
devisees) would have taken an undivided interest with the widow
of the testator and the other heirs at law (Code 1880, No. 1271)
and this would have given him an estate in possession, to be
93. Campbell v. Herron (1801) 1 N. C. 468. Cf. also M'Afee v. Gdl-
more (1828) 4 N. H. 391.
94. University v. Holstead (1816) 4 N. C. 289.
95. Whitney v. Whitney (1817) 14 Mass. 88; Sedgwick v. Minot (1863)
6 Allen (Mass.) 171. In the latter case, there was a devise to trustees to
pay the income to daughters of the testator for life, and at their death, in
fee to their appointees, or, in case of no appointment to their heirs at law.
It appeared that the children of one of the daughters were heirs at law of
their grandmother, and as such would have been entitled to the same share of
the estate, as they now will receive under the will. It was held that they
took by descent from the remote ancestor.
96. Mcllwaine v. Robson (1914) 161 Ky. 616, 171 S. W. 413; Davidson
v. Koehler (1881) 76 Ind. 398; Wheeler v. Loeschl (1912) 51 Ind. App. 262,
99 N. E. 502, correct result.
97. See e. g., Ellis v. Page (1851) 61 Mass. 161.
98. McDaniel v. Allen (1887) 64 Miss. 417, 1 So. 356.
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presently enjoyed. By the will, the widow was given an estate for
life in the whole land, instead of a portion in fee, and a remainder
in the whole was limited to the heirs at law. The estate, therefore,
given by the will, is different both in character and in the subject-
matter than would have been passed by descent, and in such cases
the heir at law takes under the will, not by descent." 99
The error here is apparent. The court applied the wrong test.
Since the devisee would have got something different under the
law, had there been no will at all, the worthier title doctrine did
not apply. But this is patently fallacious. The test should have
been whether the devisee would have taken the same quality estate
had there been no particular devise to him, all other portions of
the will remaining as they stand. Under this test, the result, of
course, is clear. The estates are the same (barring distinctions
between coparcenary and tenancy in common) and the devise is void.
In re Schlntz's Estate0 0 would be ground for wonder were it
not for the hopeless situation which the other Iowa cases divulge
in that state. Here a testator gave his children his real estate,
share and share alike, subject to the payment of his debts. He
gave, his wife eight thousand dollars insurance. Without explana-
tion the court ruled that the children took under the will and not
by descent, although Iowa purports to apply the doctrine of the
worthier title. The case is intelligible, although the reasoning is
not, when we examine an earlier case, First National Bank v.
Willie.1' 1 Here it was said that the "defendant in this case does
not acquire under the will the same share which he would have
had by descent, but a greater share, by reason of the fact that by
the will the estate is given to three of testator's children excluding
entirely the issue of a fourth child.'
'1 0 2
The fallacy here, is in part the same one observed above in
the Mississippi case. The court compares what the devisee gets
under the will with what he would have taken had there been no
will at all. In addition, the court is bothered by the quantity in the
sense of amount or value of the respective shares which the devisee
takes by will and by law. This has been the stumbling block in
many cases where it should not properly be a consideration.
In Landic v. Sims,0 3 it was decided that although the heir
took the same estate either under the will or the law, the fact that
99. 1 So. 357.
100. (1921) 192 Iowa 436, 185 N. W. 24.
101. (1901) 115 Iowa 77, 87 N. W. 734.
102. 87 N. W. 735.
103. (1893) 1 App. D. C. 507.
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under the will she took a contingent remainder or executory devise,
while under the law a vested remainder or reversion, was sufficient
to break the descent. Land was given to a wife for life and at her
death, to be sold and' divided equally among three children-if one
only survives, she to take the fee. One daughter survived, and she
took, it was said, by the devise. A conditional limitation was suffi-
cient to break the descent. "Now, a contingent remainder or an
executory devise is not the equivalent of a vested right either in
quantity or quality; nor is a vested remainder in a larger or smaller
share of the property than would have come by descent the equiv-
alent of a reversion; nor is descent through intermediate persons
the equivalent of descent from a more remote ancestor."'"" Arguing
in this vein, the opinion continues:
"If we eliminate from the will the clause under which she is sup-
posed to have taken the estate as devisee, she would have taken the
reversion of the estate upon the death of her brothers, one-third by in-
heritance from her father, and two-thirds by inheritance from her
brothers. Assuredly, while the property happens to be the same that
descended in the first instance from the father to the three children,
Elizabeth Landic never could have taken more than one-third of the
estate by descent from her father and a reversion or vested remainder
in one-third is not the legal equivalent in any respect of a contingent
remainder or executory devise of the whole, which is what she had
under the will."'10
But since the daughter has actually survived the other children,
the condition precedent to the vesting of her estate has already
occurred and she will get the same quality estate under either the
will or the law.10  The case does not take account of the later
104. Ibid. 513.
105. Ibid. 514.
106. The court states in part: "Now, a contingent remainder or an
executory devise is not the equivalent of a vested right either in quantity
or quality." We may well quarrel with the above statement when applied
to the facts in this case. Since the life tenant had a free hold estate, we
have here an attempt to give to each of the heirs at law, a. contingent re-
mainder in an undivided one-third of the estate. Pending the vesting of
such contingent remainder, the reversion in fee was not in abeyance, but in
the heirs at law. See Tiffany "Real Property" sec. 141, note 51, and Gray
"Rule against Perpetuities' sec. 11, note 1. Either from the standpoint of
quality or quantity, it is hard to see where a. contingent remainder in an un-
divided one-third of the estate with a reversionary fee of like quantity in
the same person differs from the reversionary fee of the same amount that
vould be acquired by descent. Had the estate devised to each of the heirs
been a vested instead of a contingent remainder, there is no question but
what such devise would be void as it would be an attempt to give the heir
at law exactly what he would take by descent. "The heir or heirs have, as
the representatives of the ancestor, an estate in reversion, and they cannot,
by his will, be given the same estate by way of remainder." See Tiffany
"Real Property" sec. 130, note 10. The reversion in fee arising on the crea-
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development of the worthier title doctrine whereby conditions were
regarded as no different from charges upon the estate, neither being
suffitient to break the descent. The result in Landic v. Simrms is,
therefore erroneous, as measured by the true doctrine which the
court purported to follow.
It was said in Biedler v. Biedler 07 that the rule of the worthier
title did not apply except where the devisee is sole heir to the land
devised. 08 This was, most surely, the usual situation which raised
the question at the early law. Under the rule of primogeniture,
this exact case was presented. The question of quantity, in the
sense of amount or value could not here be raised. If theparticular
devise were eliminated, the other devises being good, it is clear
that the sole heir would take the exact amount of property that he
could take under the will. This situation is easy, and the simple
dogma was developed that "a devise to the heir is void."
But where the devisee was not sole heir, as in some-of the
later cases and in many of the American cases, the question of
quantity offers a serious obstacle. Apparently, whereas the early
English courts used "quantity and quality" as a descriptive phrase,
indicating the kind and nature of the estates, the American courts
have employed "quantity" not only to indicate the quantum or ex-
tent of the estate, but the actual amount or share involved. Thus,
the proportion which the devisee takes under the will must be
identical with the proportion under the law.
Often, "quantity" is used ambiguously, now meaning quantum,
now meaning proportional share. Thus, in Illinois, it was said : 1
"But this rule is not applicable where there is a difference in
kind or quality of the estate or property to be passed under the
devise from that which would descend under the statute. Where
there is a difference in either the amount or quality of the interest
taken the rule is not applicable."
In Massachusetts the court has indicated how it has miscon-
strued the term "quantity and quality":
tion of the contingent remainder owes its origin to a rule of substantive law
providing that the seisin cannot be in abeyance. If the contingency happens,
where the devise is to a party other than an heir, we have such contingent
remainder vesting and the reversionary fee in the heir ceases to exist. Where,
as in this case, the attempt is to create a contingent remainder in the heir
at law, when the contingency happens, the devisee would have the same
estate that he would have taken by descent. Since the exact question only
arises in connection with the claim of a devisee who has satisfied the con-
tingency, such claimant has at all times had precisely the same estate that
he would have acquired by descent.
107. (1891) 87 Va. 300, 12 S. E. 753.
108. The court cited 2 Minor "Institutes" 1054.
109. Darst v. Swearingen (1906) 224 Ill. 229, 79 N. E. 635, 636.
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"If the nature or quality of the estate is changed when it comes
to the heirs, or if they take it in different shares or proportions, the
descent will be broken, and they must come in as purchasers under
the will.'
So, it seems that whereas originally "quantity and quality"
meant the quantum and tenure of the estate, it has now come to
mean the kind, tenure, and amount in the sense of proportional
share of the whole.
THE IowA ADAPTATION
Should the doctrine of worthier title be applied to a situation
where the devisee was a forced heir or one who, under the law,
could not be cut off from a share in the property of the testator, it
at once appears that the new significance of quantity becomes the
paramount question. No case can be found where this was done,
in English law. Obviously the entire doctrine grew out of a situa-
tion and was applied to circumstances where the heir could be dis-
inherited. It was a question of the legal preference of the devolu-
tion of property by descent rather than by purchase, and arose out
of practical considerations of policy already noted.
In Iowa, it is thoroughly established that the doctrine is appli-
cable where the devisee is a spouse entitled to a distributive share
under the statute."' Quantity is the big question in these cases.
Thus, a few dollars difference in value, between the two estates,
breaks the descent.112 If the devise gives more than the distribu-
tive share, it is good ;13 if slightly less, it is good, 4 but if exactly
and precisely the same in value, the devise is void." 5
It seems that this novel application, most unlike that doctrine
by the same name in the English law, came from Indiana. It was
110. Sears v. Russell (1857) 74 Mass. 86, 93-94. But cf. Bigelow, J., in
Ellis v. Page (1851) 61 Mass. 161, 164: "In considering this question, it is
to be remembered that one of the great tests by which to try the application
of the rule, is to ascertain whether the tenure or quality of the estate which
the heirs take is changed by the devise, i. e., whether they take an estate
different in quantity or quality from that which they would have taken if
the estate had not been devised, but had been left to descend to them." (Italics
ours.) Here "quantity" is accurately employed in is technical sense to refer
to the quantum of the estate.
111. Re Davis Estate (Iowa 1927) 213 N. W. 395; Re Will of Waten-
paugh (1922) 192 Iowa 1178, 186 N. W. 198; Herrin.q v. Herring (1919)
187 Iowa 593, 174 N. W. 364; Tennant v. Smith (1915) 173 Iowa 264, 155
N. W. 267.
112. Re Davis Estate supra.
113. Re Watenpaugh's Will supra.
114. Re Davis Estate supra.
115. Herring v. Herring supra.
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first suggested, by way of dictum, in 1890.1 6 In 1895, in Rawly v.
Sams,"' it was assumed that the doctrine was applicable to a sur-
viving spouse. In Thompson v. Turner,-"8 in 1909, it was actually
so applied. The court here said, after discussing the position of a
devisee who is also heir: "It seems to us the widow plaintiff oc-
cupies this situation. While it may be she does not technically take
as heir to her husband, there is no such distinction between the man-
ner of her taking and that of the heir as to affect the reason of
the rule."" 9
But the court overlooks the necessity of the wife taking, as
against the heir. The heir can be disinherited whereas the wife
cannot. The result is to lend all the emphasis to the amount of the
proportional sliares devised and set aside by law, which, in sub-
stance, establishes a rule which has little if any connection with
the original doctrine of worthier title. Obviously, the theory should
never have been applied to a forced heir or one who is insured
against being cut off by will.
The greatest difficulties that have been involved in the impli-
cations of this fictitious application of an out-of-date dogma have
arisen in a group of recent Iowa cases. Re Davis Estate' 20 is
typical. It must be remembered that the general rule at the com-
mon law is that all devises are deemed to have lapsed if the devisee
dies within the lifetime of the testator."' In many states, of which
Iowa is one,' 22 survival statutes substitute the heirs or issue of the
devisee for the deceased devisee, so that the devise does not lapse,
unless it is the expressed intention of the testator that it should
lapse. The statute was enacted, as said by the Iowa court, "to ob-
viate that result, (lapsing) and to substitute in place of the devisee
those persons 'who would presumably have enjoyed the benefits of
such devise had the devisee survived the death of the testator and
died immediately afterwards.' ",23
The facts in the Davis case were these: A testator directed
first that all his property, both real and personal, be converted into
money. He thereafter directed his executors to pay his debts, and
then to pay to his wife one-third of all money remaining in his
116. See Denny v. Denny (1890) 123 Ind. 240, 23 N. E. 519, 521.
117. (1890) 141 Ind. 179, 40 N. E. 674.
118. (1909) 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314.
119. This application of the doctrine to a spouse was expressly re-
affirmed in Dillnoan v. Fulwider (1914) 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N. E. 124,
citing Thompson v. Turner supra, and Denny v. Denny supra.
120. See supra, note 111.
121. See Ballard v. Ballard (1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 41, 43.
122. Iowa Code 1924, 11861.
123. McAllister v. McAllister (1918) 183 Iowa 245, 167 N. W. 78, 79.
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hands. The remaining two-thirds of his property was distributed
equally among his nine children including the representatives of one
deceased. The wife predeceased her husband, leaving one child
by a former marriage who claimed his mother's devise under the
survival statute. The other devisees resisted on the ground that
the devise, being the same in "quantity and quality" as the wife's
distributive share, was void. The court held otherwise, since by
law the wife would have been entitled to one-third of the realty,
irrespective of the testator's debts. Had the estate consisted
wholly of personalty, the devise and the distributive share would
have been identical. Thus a stranger to the testator's blood took
one-third of his net estate, while his nine children divided the
other two-thirds. A monstrous situation, indeed, and yet the court
was so much a victim of its own peculiar version of the worthier
title doctrine, that it saw no escape.
The case was argued ingeniously upon the theory of equitable
conversion. All testator's property was to be regarded as per-
sonalty, as of the time of his death,12 4 which thus made the wife's
distributive share identical in "quantity" with the devise. But the
court overruled this contention, rightly enough. The testator could
"convert" his property into personalty but not to deprive his spouse
of her distributive share had she survived him. "He had no power
to work such equitable conversion as against his surviving wife."' '25
The dissenting opinion, though vague, indicates the real trouble.
It asserted that the so-called "worthier title" doctrine did not apply,
though the reasons were not set forth. The reason is clear. The
doctrine never should have been applied to a spouse entitled, by
law, to dower rights or to distributive share.
The correct result in the Davis case is obtainable by the simple
application of well defined principles of law with no resort what-
ever to dubious and fictitious theories which have long since out-
grown their usefulness. It is a clear case calling for the application
of the theory of election.
The court has repeatedly committed itself to the position of
construing a will in such a situation as if the wife had survived the
testator. The problem is to determine what her rights would be
in such a case' 28
124. The following Iowa cases may be cited: Dever v. Turner (1925)
200 Iowa 926, 205 N. W. 755; Ingram v. Chandler (1917) 179 Iowa 304, 161
N. W. 434; In re Estate of Sanford (1919) 188 Iowa 833, 175 N. W. 506.
125. See 213 N. W. 396.
126. Re Hulett's Estate (1903) 121 Iowa 423, 96 N. W. 952; Re Davis
Estate supra, note 111.
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In such a situation the wife would be confronted with a will
devising to her an estate less in value and different in quality from
her distributive share under the law. Under these circumstances
she is privileged by law to elect but the will cannot affect her dis-
tributive share unless she consents to the same. The statute so pro-
vides in terms.127
However, if she refuses or fails to make the election which
the statute provides as her necessary consent, she will be conclu-
sively presumed to take under the terms of the will provided only
that necessary steps are taken to compel her to elect.28
Before this statute was enacted the wife was presumed to take
under the law rather than under the will, because she had failed to
give the consent required by the statute. And this was true even
though the devise was greater than the statutory share. A fortiori
would this be true where the devise is less than the statutory share,
because the interference with her distributive share is the more
real and obvious.129
In the absence then of such a statute, this devise must fail and
devisee's son can take nothing, because there has been no consent ex-
pressly required by statute to the interference with the wife's dis-
tributive share. This is further supported by the logic of the situa-
tion which would presumably compel the wife, had she survived, to
elect to take under the law in this case because such rights were
substantially greater than those under the will. The law does not
assume that she would do anything other than elect to enforce her
greater rights allowed by law.
The statute creating the presumption of consent was by its terms
framed by the legislature with but one situation in view, namely,
where the wife actually survives the husband. This is clear from
its language-
"in case such surviving spouse does not make such election within
six months . . .or if such surviving spouse shall be the executor of
the will, and fails . . . to refuse to take under the provisions of the
will of the deceased it shall be conclusively presumed that such survivor
consents to the provisions of the will and elects to take thereunder.' 3 0
Obviously, this statute could never have been intended to con-
trol a situation like the present one, where the wife actually pre-
127. Iowa Code 1924, 12Q06. See In re Steven'ts Estate (1913) 163 Iowa
364, 144 N. W. 644.
128. See Iowa Code 1924, 12010.
129. Everett v. Croskrey (1894) 92 Iowa 333, 60 N. W. 732. See also
Page on "Wills" (2nd ed.) sec. 1212.
130. Italics ours.
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deceased the testator, inasmuch as it is based on the theory of
consent, and here the wife by her predecease never had an oppor-
tunity to consent. The term "surviving spouse" and the provision
that if the surviving spouse is "the executor of the will," plainly
indicate that the legislature in no way contemplated the application
of this statute to a case where there was, because of a predecease,
no actual surviving spouse.
The right to elect is a personal right and cannot pass to the
heirs or personal representatives after the death of the one entitled
to elect.' - A failure to renounce the will in some states is re-
garded by statute as equivalent to an assent to the disposition of
the property as fixed by the will. 3 2 This is not true in Iowa, how-
ever, for the statute expressly provides for the service of process
upon the surviving spouse before he or she can be put to an elec-
tion. 33 The statute is regarded as being exclusively for the benefit
of such other parties as may, be interested in the property devised,
and to avail themselves of its provisions they must comply with
such requirements, and the fact that such requirements are impos-
sible in this case, because of the wife's predecease, would plausibly
indicate the inapplicability of the statute creating the presumption
of assent to the will. In the absence of such service upon the
widow the devise is of no effect whatever, and must be regarded
as absolutely null and void. It requires the widow's assent to make
it valid.3 4
Since such service compelling the widow to elect has not, and
could not be made, no act short of a voluntary election can be suf-
ficient to make the devise good. It interferes with her distributive
share without her consent contrary to the statute. It is conse-
quently nugatory 3 5
That this result is inevitable is clearly deduced from the
language used in Arnold v. Livingston supra. The court declared
that a devise to a widow is in the nature of an offer or tender to
her of the thing devised in lieu of her statutory rights. Being only
an offer or tender made to her by her husband in his will it cannot
become effectual as to her until accepted by her, that is, until she
131. Fergus v. Schiable (1912) 91 Neb. 80, 135 N. W.-448; Nordqulst~s
Estate v. Sahlbom (1911) 114 Minn. 329, 131 N. W. 323.
132. Re Arnold's Estate (1915) 249 Pa. 348, 94 AtI. 1076.
133. Newberry v. Newberry (1901) 114 Iowa 704, 87 N. W. 658; Al-
bri qht v. Albright (1911) 53 Iowa 397, 133 N. W. 737; Arnold v. Livingston(1913) 157 Iowa 677, 139 N. W. 927.
134. Arnold v. Livingston supra.
135, Thorpe v. Lyones (1913) 160 Iowa 415, 142 N. W. 82; Re Stevens'
Estate supra, note 127.
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elects to take the devise instead of her other primary rights allowed
by law.
The court here demonstrates how impossible it would be to
apply the statute creating the presumption to take under the will
to such a case as this one. It said: "The right is given them (the
other parties interested in the estate) at any time to force the
widow to an election, and to require her to make her election of
record, and it is only after this notice has been served upon her
that the conclusive presumption arises against her." It is thus argu-
able that a conclusive presumption has never arisen against the
deceased spouse and that consequently this devise by which her
child and heir claims, has never been, and, now, can never be of any
effect and validity whatsoever.
It is absurd to impute consent to a spouse who never had an
opportunity to give or withhold such consent. By former decisions
of the Iowa court such consent is not presumed by law even though
it would be advantageous to those concerned. The statute pre-
suming consent to the will by its terms contemplates an actual
refusal by the surviving spouse to elect and hence is inapplicable in
the instant case. But since no devise to a spouse can in any way
affect her distributive share without such consent, it follows irre-
sistibly that the devise here fails, and consequently her heir takes
nothing under the statute substituting the heir for the ancestor
devisee.
An analogous situation, with a result which supports the above
solution, has recently arisen under an Illinois statute providing that
where an intestate dies leaving a widow or surviving husband and
a child or children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to receive
one-third of all real estate of which the intestate died seized in
which such surviving spouse shall waive his right of dower.318
Such waiver may be effected either by recording an instrument
within one year, expressing such an intention or by failing to re-
cord, within the year, an election to take dower.
Under this statute it was held that a spouse who survived an
intestate for eight days without having filed the waiver of dower,
took a dower estate and his heirs could therefore take no interest
under him in his wife's land.137 The court argued as follows:
"The waiver of the right of dower is a condition precedent to the
right of the widow or surviving husband to claim one-third of the real
136. Illinois Descent Act, ch. 39, sec. 1, as amended 1923.
137. Braidwood v. Charles (1927) 327 IIl. 500, 159 N. E. 39, concerning
which see (1927) 23 ILLiNOiS LAw REvIEw 169.
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estate in fee, and in order to establish her or his right to the interest
in a fee a waiver of dower in a manner provided by the statute must
be alleged and proved . . . The statute gave him the right to renounce
his dower for an ampler estate, but until he exercised that right by
either or both of the methods prescribed he merely retained his dower
and did not acquire an interest in fee simple."'138
So, in the Davis case supra. The statute gives the surviving
spouse only the right to consent to an interference with her statu-
tory share, such consent being a condition precedent to the vesting
of any interest under the will. Technically, it was a power, which,
not having been exercised, could not support the claim of one
obliged to claim through such power. Had she actually survived
her husband for eight days, such consent could not be presumed,
with nothing more.139 A fortiori it cannot be presumed where she
actually predeceases him.
The fate of the worthier title at the hands of the Iowa courts
probably represents the most violence which that hoary dogma has
sustained. And yet, it must be clear that it holds many more poten-
tialities of danger when injudiciously and illogically applied. Ob-
viously the real pragmatic considerations which occasioned its de-
velopment have long since ceased to exist. But a vestige, a survival
of ancient legal theory, it serves no genuine social purpose, if ac-
curately applied. So long as courts continue to pay it lip service,
in blind and complacent adulation, we may expect many such in-
congruous and unsatisfactory situations of which the ones observed
are but illustrative.
138. 159 N. E. 39, 41.
139. In re Hoyes Estate (1924) 158 Minn. 402, 197 N. W. 852.
